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Abstract
The error-related negativity (ERN) is an event-related brain potential elicited by error commission and by presentation
of feedback stimuli indicating incorrect performance. In this study, the authors report two experiments in which
participants tried to learn to select between response options by trial and error, using feedback stimuli indicating
monetary gains and losses. The results demonstrate that the amplitude of the ERN is determined by the value of the
eliciting outcome relative to the range of outcomes possible, rather than by the objective value of the outcome. This
result is discussed in terms of a recent theory that holds that the ERN reﬂects a reward prediction error signal associated
with a neural system for reinforcement learning.
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When an organism takes an action in pursuit of a goal, the
success or failure of that effort is often indicated by an event in
the external environment. Such performance feedback can consist
of physical rewards and punishments and, for people, abstract
symbols that convey the degree of correctness or incorrectness of
the action. Typically the information conveyed by the feedback is
used by the organism to improve its performance at the task
(Thorndike, 1911/1970). When the feedback tells only the
outcome of the behavior (e.g., correct or incorrect), but not
how the behavior should be improved, that process is called
reinforcement learning (for review, see Sutton & Barto, 1998).
Much ﬂexibility in human behavior can be attributed to
principles of reinforcement learning (for review, see Davey &
Cullen, 1988), and researchers have for decades used animal
models to study its neural basis (e.g., see Gabriel, 1993;
Reynolds, Hyland, & Wickens, 2001; Schoenbaum, Chiba, &
Gallagher, 1998; Shidara & Richmond, 2002; Shima & Tanji,
1998; Waelti, Dickinson, & Schultz, 2001). This interest is
reﬂected in a recent ﬂurry of functional neuroimaging studies
investigating how rewards, punishments, and abstract perfor-
mance feedback are processed in the human brain (e.g., Breiter,
Aharon, Kahneman, Dale, & Shizgal, 2001; Bush et al., 2002;
Delgado, Locke, Stenger, & Fiez, 2003; Elliott, Newman, Longe,
&Deakin, 2003; Holroyd et al., 2003; Knutson, Adams, Fong, &
Hommer, 2001; McClure, Berns, & Montague, 2003; Monchi,
Petrides, Petre, Worsley, & Dagher, 2001; O’Doherty, Dayan,
Friston, Critchley, & Dolan, 2003; Rogers et al., 1999; Thut
et al., 1997; Ullsperger & vonCramon, 2003; VanVeen, Holroyd,
Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2002; Zalla et al., 2000).
Several studies have also examined the effect of performance
feedback on the event-related brain potential (ERP). Much of
this research has focused on the amplitude of the P300, a
parietally distributed ERP component sensitive, among many
things, to the occurrence of infrequent, task-relevant events (for
review, see Donchin&Coles, 1988).Whereas the earliest of these
studies suggested that feedback stimuli indicating incorrect
performance (negative feedback) elicited larger P300s than
feedback stimuli indicating correct performance ( positive feed-
back; e.g., MacKay, 1984; Picton, Hillyard, & Galambos, 1976;
Squires, Hillyard, & Lindsay, 1973), subsequent experiments
revealed that, when equated for probability of occurrence,
positive and negative feedback elicited equally large P300s
(Campbell, Courchesne, Picton & Squires, 1979). Rather, the
amplitude of the P300 was shown to be largest when the feedback
stimulus disconﬁrmed the participant’s prediction of the out-
come. Thus, the largest P300s were elicited by negative feedback
when participants thought they made a correct response, and by
positive feedback when participants thought they made an
incorrect response (Horst, Johnson, & Donchin, 1980). Re-
markably few of these studies examined P300 amplitude elicited
by rewards and punishments, as opposed to feedback indicating
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success or failure. The few studies that did examine this question
found that P300 amplitude increased in proportion to both the
amount of reward received and the amount of penalty incurred
(Johnston, 1979; Sutton, Tueting, Hammer, & Hakerem, 1978;
see also Yeung & Sanfey, 2003).
In contrast to the P300, a component of the ERP that was
differentially sensitive to negative and positive feedback was
recently identiﬁed by Miltner, Braun, and Coles (1997). This
component was distributed over frontal-central regions of the
scalp and reached maximum amplitude about 250 ms following
feedback presentation. Evidence of this component can be seen in
several previous ERP studies (Horst et al., 1980; Johnson &
Donchin, 1978; Picton et al., 1976; Squires et al., 1973), some of
which even identiﬁed the component (Campbell et al., 1979;
Johnston, 1979; Ruchkin, Sutton, Munson, Silver, & Macar,
1981) and discussed its involvement in error-related processing at
length (Sutton et al., 1978; Takasawa, Takino, & Yamazaki,
1990). In contrast to these studies, however, the study byMiltner
and colleagues equated for the probability of occurrence of the
positive and negative feedback, ruling out the possibility that the
component could be associated with stimulus frequency rather
than with response correctness. Miltner and colleagues proposed
that the component was related to the ‘‘error-related negativity’’
(ERN), an ERP component that reaches maximum amplitude
about 100ms following error commission in speeded response
time tasks (Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoormann, & Blanke,
1990; Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993). The
authors suggested that a single error-processing mechanism
produced both an ERN associated with error commission and an
ERN associated with feedback. This hypothesis was later
extended by Holroyd and Coles (2002), who proposed that both
the ‘‘response ERN’’ and the ‘‘feedback ERN’’ were elicited by a
system for reinforcement learning. They proposed that this
system applied information obtained from rewards and punish-
ments, as well as from abstract indicators of success and failure,
toward updating the response production system (see also
Holroyd, Coles, & Nieuwenhuis, 2002).
One unresolved issue concerns how the system that produces
the ERN determines whether an event is good or bad. Is the same
event always evaluated by the system in the same way? To
examine this issue, in this study we considered the effects of
context on the amplitude of the feedback ERN. By context we
mean the set of experimental factors that affect how a particular
feedback stimulus is evaluated. If a feedback stimulus is
evaluated the same way in different experimental contexts, then
that stimulus is evaluated in a context-independent fashion.
Conversely, if a feedback stimulus is evaluated differently in
different experimental contexts, then that stimulus is evaluated in
a context-dependent fashion. We conducted experiments in which
the context associated with particular rewards and punishments
was varied by condition. We adopted a pseudo trial-and-error
learning task in which participants selected one of several
possible actions and, following each choice, received a monetary
reward or penalty. Unbeknownst to the participants, however,
the outcomes were actually random. The experiments consisted
of three conditions, with three possible outcomes in each
condition. In a ‘‘win’’ condition, the outcomes consisted of no
money gained (nor lost), a small win, and a large win. In a ‘‘lose’’
condition, the outcomes consisted of nomoney lost (nor gained),
a small loss, and a large loss. Last, in an ‘‘even’’ condition, the
outcomes consisted of somemoney gained, somemoney lost, and
no money gained nor lost.
Figure 1 illustrates possible ways in which each outcome for
the lose, win, and even conditions could be evaluated. For all
three conditions, ‘‘worst’’ indicates the least favorable outcome,
‘‘best’’ indicates the most favorable outcome, and ‘‘middle’’
indicates the intermediate outcome. The ordinate shows, in
arbitrary units, the internal value associated with each outcome,
with positive values indicating desired outcomes and negative
values indicating undesired outcomes. If the internal values
attributed to the outcomes were context independent, then the
value associated with each outcome would reﬂect the objective
values of the outcomes (Figure 1a). In this case, the systemwould
equally value receiving nothing when it could have gainedmoney
(the worst outcome in the win condition), and receiving nothing
when it could have lost money (the best outcome in the lose
condition). In contrast, if the internal values were context
dependent, then the system would determine the value of each
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Figure 1. Examples of value system context dependence. (a): Context
independent value system. (b): Context dependent value system. (c):
Value system exhibiting both context dependence and context
independence. Lose, win, even: task conditions. Worst, middle, best:
the worst, intermediate, and best of three possible outcomes, respectively,
for each condition, as given by their objective values. Ordinate
corresponds to the internal value attributed to each outcome, in
arbitrary units; positive values indicate desired outcomes and negative
values indicate undesired outcomes. See text for details.
outcome relative to the other potential outcomes in the same
condition, rather than in terms of the objective value associated
with each outcome (Figure 1b). Thus, in this example, the system
would value receiving nothing when it could have lost money
more than receiving nothing when it could have gained money.
Figure 1c illustrates a third possibility involving a combination of
context dependence and context independence (‘‘partial depen-
dence’’). Note that in this case, the system values a large gain in
the win condition more than receiving nothing in the lose
condition (context independence), and values receiving nothing
in the lose condition more than receiving nothing in the win
condition (context dependence). Of course, such a system of
preferences could be described by a myriad of value functions, so
long as the functions increased monotonically with reward
(French, 1988); we adopted the linear functions in Figure 1
simply for ease of exposition.
To investigate how context affects the system that produces
the ERN, we conducted two experiments. The ﬁrst experiment
consisted of an even condition, and the second experiment
consisted of both a win condition and a lose condition. The
results are interpreted in terms of the reinforcement learning
theory of the ERN (Holroyd & Coles, 2002).
Method
Participants
Sixteen people participated in Experiment 1 (12 men, 4 women)
and 16 other people participated in Experiment 2 (11 men, 5
women). Most participants were undergraduate students at
Princeton University (age 26.0  9.7 years) and took part in the
experiment either for course credit or for payment ($20.00 for a
2-h session). In addition, all participants were paid a sum of
bonus money ($5.00 for Experiment 1, $15.00 for Experiment 2)
at the end of the session (see below).
Task
In both experiments, participants sat comfortably about 1.5m in
front of a computer screen in an electromagnetically shielded
room. On each trial of both experiments, participants saw an
imperative stimulus (0.61 high, 5.01 wide, white color against a
black background) consisting of three circles in a row (i.e.,
‘‘O O O’’). Participants were asked to imagine that these
circles were balloons, and told that some of the balloons
contained an item (see below). The imperative stimulus remained
on the screen until the participant selected a balloon by pressing
one of three buttons on a response pad. At the time of the
response, the imperative stimulus was replaced by a second sti-
mulus (0.61 high, 5.01 wide, blue color, 1 s duration) in which the
selected balloon was replaced by an asterisk (e.g., ‘‘O n O,’’ if
the participant selected the middle balloon). The purpose of the
asterisk was to indicate to the participant which balloon they had
selected. Following the offset of the second stimulus, a feedback
stimulus appeared (0.61, red color, 1 s duration) directly above
the location associated with the middle balloon. The interstimu-
lus interval (ISI) between the offset of the feedback stimulus and
the onset of the next imperative stimulus was 0.5 s.
In Experiment 1 (the ‘‘even’’ condition), participants were
told that they would begin the task with $5.00 in bonus money,
and that on each trial one of the balloons contained a dime, that a
second balloon contained nothing, and that a third balloon
contained a ‘‘gremlin’’ that would steal 10 cents from them. The
feedback stimuli consisted of three corresponding types: a ‘‘1’’
stimulus informed participants that they gained 10 cents, a ‘‘–’’
stimulus informed the participants that they lost 10 cents, and a
‘‘o’’ stimulus informed the participants that they neither gained
nor lost any money. (Note that the feedback stimuli were not
counterbalanced across participants because the ERN is
insensitive to the physical nature of the stimuli, as it can be
elicited by arbitrary stimuli inmultiple inputmodalities; Holroyd
& Coles, 2002; Miltner et al., 1997.) Participants were told they
should respond in such a way that they would maximize
the amount of money they would receive at the end of the
experiment. They were also told that they would not end
the experiment owing the experimenter money. Unbeknownst to
the participants, the type of feedback stimulus was selected at
random, with equal probability and without replacement, on
each trial. The task was divided into three blocks of 99 trials.
Thus participants saw each feedback stimulus 33 times per block,
and 99 times across the entire experiment. Because the feedback
probabilities were balanced across feedback types, participants
neither earned nor lost money and at the end of the experiment
were given the $5.00 in bonus money with which they began the
task. No information about the participants’ overall perfor-
mance was provided until the end of the experiment, when they
received the bonus.
Experiment 2 consisted of two conditions. In a ‘‘win’’
condition, participants were told that one of the three balloons
was empty, that a second balloon contained 2.5 cents, and that
the third balloon contained 5 cents. The feedback stimuli
consisted of three corresponding types: a ‘‘o’’ stimulus informed
participants that they neither gained nor lost any money, a ‘‘1’’
stimulus informed participants that they gained 2.5 cents, and a
‘‘11’’ stimulus informed participants that they gained 5 cents.
Participants were told that they should respond in such a way
that they would maximize the amount of bonus money obtained.
In a ‘‘lose’’ condition, participants were told that they would
begin the task with $15.00 in bonus money, and that one of the
three balloons was empty, that a second balloon contained a
gremlin that would steal 2.5 cents from them, and that third
balloon contained a ‘‘big gremlin’’ that would steal 5 cents from
them. The feedback stimuli consisted of three corresponding
types: a ‘‘o’’ stimulus indicated to the participant that they
neither gained nor lost any money, a ‘‘–’’ stimulus indicated to
the participant that they lost 2.5 cents, and a ‘‘– –’’ stimulus
indicated to the participant that they lost 5 cents. Participants
were told to respond in such a way that they would maximize the
amount of bonus money saved. As in Experiment 1, the type of
feedback stimulus was selected at random, with equal probability
and without replacement, on each trial in each condition. Each
condition was divided into three blocks of 99 trials, so the parti-
cipants saw each feedback stimulus 33 times per block, and 99
times across each condition. In the win condition, participants
earned $7.50 in bonus money, and in the lose condition, partici-
pants saved $7.50 in bonusmoney. Thus the participants received
$15.00 in bonus money at the end of the session. At the end of the
ﬁrst condition, participants were told the amount of bonus money
they earned in that condition and were informed that they would
receive the money at the end of the session. The order of the two
conditions was counterbalanced across participants.1
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1In addition to the reward tasks, an ‘‘oddball’’ task, in which
participants counted the occurrence of an infrequent target stimulus, was
also conducted in each experiment. This data will be presented elsewhere
(Holroyd, in press).
Data Acquisition
An 87-channel electrode cap with Ag/AgCl electrodes was
applied to each participant. The electroencephalogram (EEG)
was recorded along the midline according to the 10–20 system
from channels FPz, AFz, Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz, Pz, OPz, Oz, and Iz
(Jasper, 1958). Other electrodeswere placed on the rightmastoid,
above and below the right eye, and on the outer canthi of both
eyes. The electrode common was placed on the chin or on the
cheek. All electrode recordings were referenced to an electrode
placed on the left mastoid. EEG data were recorded with
Sensorium Inc. (Charlotte, VT) EPA-6 128 Channel Electro-
Physiology Ampliﬁers at a sample rate of 250Hz (bandpass 0.1–
300Hz). Impedanceswere less than 40KO. Experimental control
and data acquisition were controlled by E-Prime (Psychology
Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA) and Cogniscan (New-
foundland, NJ), respectively. Participants completed a short
questionnaire upon completion of the experiment.
Data Analysis
For each feedback stimulus, a 1-s epoch of data (200ms baseline)
was extracted from the continuous data ﬁle for analysis. Ocular
artifact was corrected with an eye-movement correction algo-
rithm (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1983). The EEG data were
rereferenced off-line to linked-mastoid electrodes and baseline
corrected by subtracting, from each sample of data recorded at
each channel, one-half the activity recorded at the right mastoid
and the average activity of that channel during the baseline
period. Single trial EEG data were lowpass ﬁltered below 20 Hz
with the Interactive Data Language (Research Systems, Inc.,
Boulder, CO) digital ﬁlter algorithm. ERPs were created for each
participant by averaging the single-trial EEG according to
feedback type.
ERN amplitude was measured base to peak at all EEG
channels with an algorithm described in Holroyd, Nieuwenhuis,
Yeung, and Cohen (in press). The amplitude of this component
was then evaluated at channel FCz, where it reached amaximum.
The data were submitted to analysis of variance (ANOVA) with
repeated measures, and to paired t tests. The Greenhouse–
Geisser correction for repeated measures was applied where
appropriate (Keselman & Rogan, 1980).
Results
Behavior
Because the feedback stimuli in the reward tasks were delivered at
random, the task did not allow for any meaningful analysis of
participant performance. However, upon completion of the task,
the participants were asked to rate the amount of attention they
paid to the feedback stimuli on a scale from 1 (the feedback
stimuli were generally ignored ) to 5 (the feedback stimuli were
evaluated closely; participants were interested whether or not they
won or lost money on each trial). Participants rated their interest
in the feedback as 4.0  0.8 on the scale, suggesting that they did,
in fact, attend to the task in which they were engaged.
Furthermore, debrieﬁng revealed that most participants detected
transient patterns in the feedback or believed that they exercised
some degree of control over the feedback, suggesting that they
evaluated the feedback and tried to use it to guide their
performance.
ERPs
Figure 2 illustrates the scalp distribution of the ERN for the even
(top) and lose and win (bottom) conditions. As can be seen from
the ﬁgure, the feedback ERN displayed a frontal/frontal-central
scalp distribution (cf. Gehring andWilloughby, 2002; Miltner et
al., 1997). For Experiment 1 (the even condition), a two-way
repeated measures ANOVA on outcome (worst, middle, best)
and electrode (the 10 midline electrodes) revealed main effects of
outcome, F(2,30)5 9.5, po.005, e5 0.81, and electrode, F(9,
135)5 10.4, po.0005, e5 0.24, and an interaction between
electrode and outcome, F(18,270)5 3.05, po.05, e5 0.22.
Similarly, for Experiment 2, a three-way repeated-measures
ANOVAonoutcome (worst, middle, best), condition (lose, win),
and electrode (the 10midline electrodes) revealed amain effect of
outcome, F(2,30)5 6.54, p5 .005, e5 0.96, a main effect of
electrode, F(9,135)5 13.7, po.0001, e5 0.29, and an outcome
by electrode interaction, F(18,270)5 5.2, po.001, e5 0.23. In
contrast, the main effect of condition and all interactions
involving condition were not signiﬁcant, p4.05.
To examine the ERN more closely, we evaluated the ERN at
channel FCz, where it was largest. Figure 3 illustrates the ERPs,
recorded at channel FCz, elicited by the feedback stimuli in
Experiment 1 (a) and Experiment 2 (b and c). The ERN can be
seen as the negativity peaking at about 250ms in response
to negative feedback (see for example the ‘‘–’’ condition in Figure
3a). This negativity does not appear in response to stimuli
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Figure 2. ERN scalp distributions for the even (Experiment 1, top) and
lose and win (Experiment 2, bottom) conditions. Solid, dashed, and
dotted lines correspond, respectively, to the worst, middle, and best
outcomes within each condition. Ordinate is in microvolts. Abscissa:
electrode location.
indicating that participants received maximum reward (e.g., the
‘‘1’’ condition in Figure 3a). Figure 4 plots the amplitude of the
ERN associated with these conditions according to their relative
outcome. For Experiment 1 (the even condition), a one-way
ANOVA with repeated measures on ERN amplitude as a
function of outcome (worst, middle, best) indicated that not all
the ERN amplitudes were equal, F(2,30)5 8.4, po.005,
e5 0.87. For Experiment 2, a two-way repeated-measures
ANOVA on condition (win, lose) and outcome (worst, middle,
best) on ERN amplitudes revealed amain effect of outcome, F(2,
30)5 9.0, p5 .001, e5 0.96, but no effect of condition, F(1,
15)5 0.3, p5 0.60, nor a condition by outcome interaction F(2,
30)5 1.0, p5 0.39. Taken together, these results suggest that the
system that produces the ERN is context dependent: The system
appears to determine the value associated with each outcome
relative to the other potential outcomes in the same condition,
rather than in terms of the objective value associated with each
outcome (Figure 1b). This interpretation is underscored by a
paired t test indicating that the empty balloons in the win
condition (which represented the worst outcome) elicited larger
ERNs than the empty balloons in the lose condition (which
represented the best outcome; Figure 5a), t(15)53.3, po.005;
and by a paired t test suggesting that themiddle outcomes in both
conditions elicited ERNs of comparable size (Figure 5b),
t(15)5 0.4, p5 .72. Thus, the value associated with a particular
outcome appears to depend on the context in which the outcome
is received: In one case, identical outcomes (empty balloons) are
associated with different values, and in the other case, different
outcomes (‘‘1’’ and ‘‘–’’) are associated with similar values.
For the ERN to reﬂect a value system, however, the
amplitude of the ERN must be ordered by preference, such that
the amplitude of the worst outcome is greater than or equal to the
amplitude of themiddle outcome, which in turn is greater than or
equal to the amplitude of the best outcome. In fact, conﬁdence
intervals associated with Bonferroni multiple pairwise compar-
isons indicated that, for both Experiment 1 (the even condition)
and Experiment 2 (data collapsed across the win and lose
conditions), ERN amplitudes were signiﬁcantly different from
each other between the worst and best outcomes (Experiment 1
[3.8mV, 0.9mV], Experiment 2 [3.4mV, 0.8mV]), and
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Figure 3. ERPs. (a): Experiment 1.  , o,1: ERPs elicited by the worst,
middle, and best outcomes of the even condition, respectively. (b):
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Figure 4. ERN amplitudes recorded at channel FCz, for the lose, win,
and even conditions. Worst, middle, best: the worst, intermediate, and
best of the three outcomes, respectively, for each condition.
between the middle and best outcomes (Experiment 1 [3.0mV,
0.9mV], Experiment 2 [2.5 mV, 0.1mV]), but not between
the worst andmiddle outcomes (Experiment 1 [2.2mV, 0.7mV],
Experiment 2 [2.1 mV, 0.4mV]).
Discussion
These results strongly suggest that the system that produces the
ERN operates in a context-dependent manner: The system
determines whether an outcome is favorable or unfavorable on
the basis of the range of possible outcomes it might have
encountered in the current setting. As such, the system judges the
best possible outcome to be favorable and the worst possible
outcome to be unfavorable. For example, a $1,000 rewardwould
be considered favorable if the alternative reward was $500, but
the same $1,000 reward would be considered unfavorable if the
alternative reward was $2,000.
We interpret this ﬁnding in terms of the reinforcement
learning theory of the ERN (Holroyd & Coles, 2002). According
to this theory, a monitoring system located in the basal ganglia
continually evaluates ongoing events, including responses and
feedback, and predicts whether those events will terminate
favorably or unfavorably. When the monitoring system revises
its prediction for the better, it produces a positive prediction error
signal (indicating that ongoing events are ‘‘better than
expected’’), and when the monitoring system revises its predic-
tions for the worse, it produces a negative prediction error signal
(indicating that ongoing events are ‘‘worse than expected’’). The
theory holds that the mesencephalic dopamine system conveys
these error signals back to the basal ganglia, which use the error
signals to improve their own predictions (for reviews, see Schultz,
1998, 2002), and to motor areas in anterior cingulate cortex,
which use the error signals to improve performance on the task at
hand. Furthermore, the theory proposes that variation in ERN
amplitude is produced by the impact of these phasic dopamine
error signals on anterior cingulate cortex, with phasic decreases
in dopamine associated with larger ERN amplitudes and phasic
increases in dopamine associated with smaller ERN amplitudes
(see Holroyd, in press).
The results of the present study ﬁt naturally within this
theoretical framework. According to the theory, when presented
with three possible outcomes such that the objective value of the
middle outcome is halfway between the objective values of the
best and worst outcomes, the system that produces the ERN will
come to predict the middle value. Furthermore, departures from
this expected outcomewill produce relative increases or decreases
in ERN amplitude, as observed. This computational process
establishes context dependence: An outcome is judged to be good
or bad relative to the expectation, rather than in terms of its
objective value. These results dovetail with those of a recent
experiment by Yeung and Sanfey (2003), who showed that ERN
amplitudes elicited by large losses in the context of large gains
and losses are about the same size as ERN amplitudes elicited by
small losses in the context of small gains and losses. Thus, the
evaluative system that produces the ERN appears to normalize
its evaluations according to the best and worst outcomes judged
possible in the task: Losing $1,000 when $1,000 is the maximum
loss possible appears to be ‘‘just as bad’’ as losing $2,000 when
$2,000 is the maximum loss possible.
An important unresolved issue concerns the fact that, in both
of the experiments in this study, the ERNs associated with the
worst and middle outcomes were not signiﬁcantly different from
each other. This ﬁnding may have occurred either because the
study lacked sufﬁcient statistical power to distinguish the size of
the ERN between the two conditions or because the value
function associated with the ERN is actually nonlinear,
weighting the worst and middle outcomes more or less equally.
Moreover, it may have been the case that the participants,
believing that they had discovered contingencies between their
responses and the feedback stimuli, tended to predict that their
responses would achieve maximum reward (rather than the
average reward); if so, then the intermediate outcomes would
have been worse than they expected and would have produced
ERNs. This question remains a subject for future research.
Other predictions of the theory have been tested in a recent
series of trial-and-error and pseudo trial-and-error learning
experiments (cf. Badgaiyan & Posner, 1998; Luu, Tucker,
Derryberry, Reed, & Poulsen, 2003; Ruchsow, Grothe, Spitzer,
& Kiefer, 2002; Wang, Kong, Tang, Zhuang, & Li, 2000).
According to the theory, for example, the monitoring system
comes to expect rewardwhen rewards are frequent, and to expect
nothing when rewards are infrequent; thus the ERN elicited by
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an absence of an expected reward when rewards are frequent
should be larger than the ERN elicited by an absence of an
expected reward when rewards are infrequent. This prediction
was conﬁrmed in a recent experiment (Holroyd et al., in press). In
another study, in a condition in which the rewards and
punishments were random and equiprobable, the amplitude of
the ERN tracked the reward prediction error on a trial-by-trial
basis; consistent with the theory, the system appeared to use the
feedback information on each trial to update its predictions for
future trials (Holroyd & Coles, 2002). Even in a task without
feedback, ERN amplitude at the time of error commission
increased as the probability of making the error decreased
(Holroyd & Coles, 2002), suggesting that infrequent errors are
associated with large negative prediction errors. The theory also
holds that, when the stimulus–response mappings are ﬁxed and
can be learned, the ERN should occur at the time of the error
response and not at the time of feedback presentation. According
to the theory, on such trials the system detects the error at the
time of the response, producing a negative prediction error and a
large ERN, and so by the time of feedback presentation the
system has already detected the error, thus producing no change
in prediction and no ERNFa prediction that has also been
conﬁrmed (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2002).
Other evidence indicates that the system that produces the
ERN does not depend on whether the feedback indicates a gain
or loss per se, but rather on any performance-related information
conveyed by the feedback. As a case in point, Gehring and
Willoughby (2002) recently conducted a gambling task in which
the feedback stimuli on each trial conveyed information along
two different dimensions: a ‘‘gain/loss’’ dimension indicating
monetary gains or losses, and a ‘‘correct/error’’ dimension
indicating the degree of correctness or incorrectness of the
response. The authors inferred from their data that a ‘‘medial
frontal negativity’’ (MFN) was sensitive to the gain/loss
information conveyed by the feedback (being larger to feedback
indicating loss than to feedback indicating gain), and that the
MFN was insensitive to the correct/error information conveyed
by the feedback. Although the MFN and the feedback ERN
share similar latencies (about 250–300ms following feedback
onset) and scalp distributions (frontal-central), the results of this
study seemed to suggest that the MFN was a new component
that was distinct from the feedback ERN. In a separate
experiment, however, we replicated the original results reported
by Gehring and Willoughby and demonstrated that the
negativity elicited by the feedback stimuli in the gambling task
is sensitive to both the gain/loss information and the correct/
error information conveyed by the feedback stimuli, depending
on which aspect of the feedback stimuli is made most salient to
the participants (Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, Holroyd, Schurger, &
Cohen, in press; see also Holroyd, Coles, et al., 2002). These
results indicate that the system that produces the ERN can base
its evaluations on different types of performance-related
information, and that the type of information can be determined
by the environmental context in which the information is
provided.
It is worth noting that studies that have investigated the
biological mechanisms that give rise to the ERN have also
provided support for the theory (see also Holroyd & Coles,
2002). The theory is predicated on the observation that
mesencephalic dopaminergic neurons appear to carry a reward
prediction error signal (Schultz, 1998, 2002). Importantly, this
proposal leads to the straightforward prediction that disruption
of themesencephalic dopamine system should affect the ERN. In
fact, several studies have provided evidence consistent with this
prediction. For example, administration of d-amphetamine,
which releases dopamine and inhibits its reuptake, increases
ERN amplitude (De Bruijn, Hulstijn, Verkes, Ruigt, & Sabbe,
2003). Conversely, alcohol consumption reduces ERN ampli-
tude (Ridderinkhof et al., 2002), possibly because alcohol affects
dopamine receptors (Holroyd & Yeung, 2003). ERN amplitude
also decreases with age, an observation that has been attributed
to age-related changes in dopamine function (Nieuwenhuis et al.,
2002). In theory, Parkinson’s disease, which damages the
mesencephalic dopamine system, should also reduce the
amplitude of the ERN, but evidence to this effect has been
mixed, with experiments indicating both a reduction (Falkenstein
et al., 2001) and no reduction (Holroyd, Praamstra, Plat, &
Coles, 2002). The theory also holds that the response ERN and
the feedback ERN are produced by the impact of these dopamine
error signals on the same area of anterior cingulate cortex. In
fact, the results of several equivalent dipole source localization
experiments have suggested that anterior cingulate cortex
represents a common source for both the response ERN (e.g.,
Dehaene, Posner, & Tucker, 1994; Holroyd, Dien, & Coles,
1998) and the feedback ERN (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002;
Miltner et al., 1997). Furthermore, a recent functional magnetic
resonance imaging study has demonstrated that a single area in
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex activates for both error responses
and error feedback in a trial-and-error learning task (Holroyd et
al., 2003). Moreover, activity of this region of dorsal anterior
cingulate cortex is greatest in the same conditions in which ERN
amplitude is also largest, namely, when the negative prediction
error is large (cf. Holroyd & Coles, 2002).
In summary, when taken together, these studies provide
support for the hypothesis that the ERN is produced by a
predictive error signal conveyed by the mesencephalic dopamine
system to anterior cingulate cortex. The present study con-
tributes to that body of knowledge by demonstrating that the
system that produces the ERN bases its evaluations not on the
objective value of the outcome that was obtained, but rather on
the value of the outcome relative to the range of other outcomes
possible in the task. This research promises to inform the study of
how evaluative mechanisms apply performance-related error
information for behavioral adaptation.
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